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The Evolution of American Discovery in
Light of Constitutional Challenges: The Role
of the 2015 Rule Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
by TOM LIN*
Those civil tribunals, far more than the inherently
uncivilized dueling fields they supplanted, must be
governed by sound rules of practice and procedure ....
- Chief Justice John Roberts'
[F]orcing a defendant to pay significant discovery
expenses (without any contribution from the plaintiff)
absent any finding of liability arguably infringes the
defendant's right to due process.
- John Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan SchwartZ 2
[T]he proposals have the unconstitutional effect of killing
legitimate cases, depriving plaintiffs of the right to jury
trial.
- Joseph R. Neal, Jr.
* Class of 2017, University of California, Hastings. I am forever indebted to Professor
Richard Marcus for his guidance on this project, mentorship on my academic and professional
career, and for being the best Civil Procedure professor.
1. Chief Justice Roberts, 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 3, 6 (Dec. 31,
2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
2. John Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan Schwartz, Can E-Discovery Violate Due
Process? Part 2, LEGAL TECH NEWS (June 10, 2013), http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=
12026033231 2 6/Can-EDiscovery-Violate-Due-Process-Part-2?sireturn=20160220045807.
3. Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Hon.
Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair of Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 2, 2014) ("[T]he
proposals have the unconstitutional effect of killing legitimate cases, depriving plaintiffs of the
right to jury trial."), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/1793 1/download.
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Introduction
The idea of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure violating constitutional
rights may appear nonsensical at first glance because it would be
counterintuitive for rulemakers to spend so much time, money, and effort
drafting a rule that does not work. However, it is not the means behind the
rule that raise constitutional challenges, it is the ends that allegedly result in
costly and burdensome effects in combination with other unique elements
of American discovery that trigger these issues. Effective December 1,
2015, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) was amended to provide:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount
in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant
information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.4
Compare the amended Rule 26(b)(1) to the old Rule 26(b)(1):
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (effective Dec. 1, 2015) (emphasis added to identify
amendment).
5. Id. (amended Dec. 1, 2015).
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American discovery has been a unique feature of litigation in the
world even before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938.6 In May 2010, more than 180 federal judges, practitioners, and
academics gathered for a conference at Duke University School of Law to
undertake a comprehensive examination of issues relating to access,
fairness, cost, and delay in civil litigation.7 The Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules8 sponsored and organized this event to
gather empirical data on current litigation practices in federal courts.9 The
conference discussed the need for clarification, regarding the duty to
preserve electronic discovery and when discovery sanctions were
appropriate because substantial costs were often incurred to preserve
information in anticipation for litigation that rarely happens. The goals
articulated during the 2010 conference included Rule 26(b)(1)'s revamped
scope of discovery, which put a spotlight on the importance of managing
cost and proportionality.
Recently, some have raised constitutional attacks on American
discovery because of the excessive burdens involved and the "takings"
aspect related to the costs of producing requested evidence. The most basic
understanding of due process is that "[t]he United States cannot interfere
with private rights any more than a State can, except for legitimate
governmental purposes. They are ... prohibited from depriving persons or
corporations of property without due process of law."'o The 2015
amendments responded to these challenges by focusing on the issues that
give rise to constitutional arguments by restricting over-discovery and
eliminating the need to over-preserve electronically stored information
while maintaining access to proportional discovery relevant to the needs of
the case.
6. John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010).
7. Richard Marcus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 615, 624
(2014).
8. See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 213, 214, 216 (2010) ("In 1935, the Supreme Court appointed a blue ribbon advisory
committee to draft the rules of civil procedure, the first rules adopted under the Rules Enabling
Act. Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in September 1938 is often described as
the 'Big Bang.' . . . One of those advisory committees is the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
which studies and makes recommendations to the Standing Committee and the Judicial
Conference regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
9. Duke Law Hosts Conference on Litigation in Federal Courts, DUKE LAW NEWS (May
5, 2010), https://law.duke.edu/news/4933/.
10. E. Donald Elliott, Twombly In Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) is
Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L REV. 895, 901 n.20 (2012) (quoting Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
700, 718-19 (1879)).
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For decades now, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have attempted to refine the rules for civil litigation to facilitate dispute
resolutions between adverse parties efficiently and at low costs. However,
one common theme remained when the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules convened at the Duke Conference in 2010 to discuss the current state
of litigation, which was at the time too expensive, time consuming,
contentious, and inhibited effective access to courts." The 2010
conference initiated the rule amendment project discussed in this Note,
which includes procedural reforms geared towards: (1) encouraging greater
cooperation among counsel; (2) concentrating discovery on material that is
"truly" necessary to resolve the case; (3) keeping judges engaged and
active in early stages of case management; and (4) addressing the recent
need for managing problems between parties with large amounts of
electronically stored information.1 2 Some recent constitutional challenges
to American discovery, specifically the scope of discovery under Rule
26(b)(1), came during the public comment period when the amendment
package was proposed. The 2010 conference at Duke University School of
Law also addressed criticisms regarding pleading standards because
"discovery costs are excessive and cannot effectively be controlled by
judges managing cases."" Broad discovery requests are analogous to the
generalized pleading standards of the past. Heightened pleading standards
dealt with the same type of issues that Rule 26(b)(1)'s scope of discovery
intends to eliminate in terms of disposing meritless claims and minimizing
costs incurred by defendants that are associated with discovery fishing
expeditions.14
The 2015 amendments were adopted to resolve the issues that occur in
an adversarial system in which the producing party pays for discovery.
With the rise of electronic discovery, where parties store data that may
become the target of discovery in future litigation, the effort for reform has
become more prominent. In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held
that a party has broad latitude in requesting relevant discovery from
opposing counsel.' 5  Some argue litigants often use discovery tools to
harass their opposing parties because the American legal system is
11. Chief Justice Roberts, supra note 1, at 4.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Lee H. Rosenthal, Pleading, for the Future: Conversations After lqbal, 114 PENN ST. L.
REv. 1537, 1545 (2010).
14. See generally Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to lqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J. 1 (2010).
15. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 496, 513 (1947).
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adversarial.1 6  The Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendments quoted
language from Hickman regarding the need for pretrial discovery:
"[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation."17 In Hickman, Justice Murphy stated, "either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession."'" "But discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate
and necessary boundaries." 9 This Note discusses how big of a role
proportionality will play under the 2015 amendments in blunting due
process objections based on over-discovery costs and reinforcing those
limitations on discovery referred to in Hickman.
In addition to emphasizing proportionality, the 2015 amendments also
deal with the duty to preserve electronically stored information. 2 0 The duty
to preserve produces considerable expenses because it entails a much larger
amount of information compared to storage via paper and adds to the
overall costs of litigation.21 The duty to preserve is also accompanied by
judicial reprimands for failing to do so via sanctions.22 Previously, a basic
failure to preserve electronically stored information allowed the requesting
party to gain an advantage by receiving a favorable jury instruction or, even
better, a judgment in its favor.23 These additional expenses and burdens are
associated in the overall costs of discovery that are claimed by some to
amount to constitutional violations.
Section I of this Note introduces the recent constitutional attacks on
American discovery due to both the burdens in producing and the taking of
private property. Section II compares the American legal system's
management of discovery to other legal systems. This section also explains
16. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the
American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98
CORNELL L. REv. 327, 328-29 (2013).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments; Hickman, 329
U.S. at 507.
18. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
19. Id at 507-08 ("[L]imitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination
is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass or oppress the person
subject to the inquiry. And as Rule 26(b) provides, further limitations come into existence when
the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege.").
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
21. Richard Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution or
Revolution?, 102 Nw. U. L.REv. 1827, 1844 (2008).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
23. Joshua E. Roberts, Duties Involving the Preservation of Electronically Stored
Information, SPORTS & FITNESS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.sfia.org/
press/389_Duties-Involving-The-Preservation-Of-Electronically-Stored-Information.
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how the differences in cost-shifting, the existence of the contingency fee,
and broad discovery motivates the due process argument. Section III lays
out the history of Rule 26 starting from-the introduction of proportionality
in 1983 and past amendments leading up to 2015. Section IV highlights
the intentions and motivations behind the 2015 amendments by discussing
the elevation of proportionality and the reordering of factors that guide the
proportionality calculations. Section V explains the impact of the
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) with early judicial interpretations and how its
restrictive goals impact due process arguments for responding parties. The
majority of decisions since December 2015 dealt with measuring
proportionality and figuring out what to do after it is measured-none of
which involved a party's constitutional rights. Section VI discusses how
electronically stored information production relates to proportionality and
explores the consequences imposed on parties that have to preserve any and
all information stored in the course of litigation. This Note concludes that
American discovery has not in the past-and certainly will not under the
2015 amendments-violate any constitutional rights.
I. Constitutional Challenges to American Discovery
The Supreme Court has stated that rules should be construed in ways
that "avoid potential constitutional issues."24 Despite the Court's view on
rules, some scholars still continue to argue that forcing a litigant to respond
to a broad and voluminous discovery request has the potential to violate the
litigant's right to due process. 25 Likewise, individuals often argue that a
litigant's access to potentially relevant information, helpful to his or her
case, violates that individual's right to a jury trial if restricted.2 6 Prior to
the most recent amendments, plaintiffs were often accused of propounding
costly and broad discovery requests on defendants without, and before, any
finding of liability because of a system in which the producer pays the cost
of production.2 7 These constitutional arguments have intensified the debate
of where rulemakers should draw the line when reforming discovery tools.
Finding the proper balance between these two interests is one example of
what makes rulemaking so difficult due to competing views. 2 8
24. Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure: Review
of Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit
(Part II), 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 330, 331 (2010).
25. Beisner, supra note 2.
26. See supra note 3.
27. Id.
28. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 626.
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The topic of pleading standards went through similar scrutiny in the
aftermath of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,29 Ashcroft v. 1qbal,30 and
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.31 These decisions were
motivated by the need for gatekeeping in order to encourage individuals to
file meritorious claims and allows for efficient resolution of those claims.32
Justice Stevens dissented in Twombly and criticized the majority for
arriving at its decision in order to protect wealthy corporations.3 3 Similar
to the public comments for the 2015 amendments, Twombly and its
progeny discussed the proper balance between the rights of litigants and
whether the correct line should be drawn in favor of defendants to shield
the burdensome discovery costs of litigation from implausible claims.34
Twombly addressed a fiercely debated topic regarding "the threat [that]
discovery expenses will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching proceedings [on the merits]."3 The
plausibility standard set forth in Twombly is what proportionality is to the
scope of discovery after December 1, 2015. The concerns discussed back
then are analogous to the remedy the 2015 amendments attempt to
reinforce as shown by Justice Stevens dissenting in Twombly where
[parties] need "careful case management, including strict control of
discovery . . . ."36 Twombly and Jqbal created controversy in the legal field,
but the underlying public policy consideration was that notice pleading37
was no longer sufficient to safeguard defendants against the costly burdens
associated with discovery and litigation. Similarly, the previous scope of
discovery that resulted in broad over-discovery is no longer sufficient to
29. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ("[W]e do not require heightened
fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.").
30. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (holding that a plaintiff cannot plead a
defendant's intent "generally" without reference to its factual context in order for a claim to
survive a motion to dismiss and an entitlement to discovery).
31. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329 (2007) (holding that a
plaintiff alleging fraud must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any
plausible opposing inference and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence at trial).
32. Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating
Pleadings, 87 DENv. U. L. REv. 245, 246 (2010).
33. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Z. W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2008).
35. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (lamenting the threat that discovery expenses might
sometimes compel defendants to settle even unmeritorious cases).
36. Id at 573.
37. Notice pleading, as set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), was the standard
before the Court adopted the more strict plausibility standard in Twombly.
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safeguard litigants against the excessive expenses associated with modem
litigation.
Pleading standards faced arguments from two sides. In the past,
plaintiffs claimed that discovery was indispensable to make their case
while defendants claimed that discovery was used to oppress and abuse the
legal system. 38 Similarly, there were two opposing views regarding the
scope of discovery in the public comment period of the 2015 amendments.
In order to appreciate each side's constitutional arguments, one must
understand the debate as overstating the issues. One side of the argument
is the challenge in favor of broad discovery because of the constitutional
right to a jury trial. The constitutional right to a jury trial does not imply a
constitutional right to discovery. Plaintiffs often argue for broad discovery
to get the real evidence helpful to their cases. However, since there is no
constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, which can involve the
most severe deprivations of life and liberty, it follows that there also is no
constitutional right to discovery in civil cases. 39 The Compulsory Process
Clause comes closer but only in criminal cases. The Sixth Amendment
reads, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 4 0 The
Supreme Court has held that the right to present a witness is not absolute
and a discovery sanction precluding such witnesses are constitutional.4 1
A. Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
Although there is no constitutional right to discovery, the restriction of
access to relevant evidence has been argued by some to have the effect of
depriving a litigant of the ability to reach a jury.42 The history of the
Seventh Amendment demonstrates the flaws of this argument. In England,
the right to a civil jury trial existed for common law courts, rather than
courts of equity.43 Colonial America adopted many of the English practices
in both criminal and civil law when it first set up governments, but by 1787
38. Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal
with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 187, 192 (2010).
39. See Imre Stephen Szalai, A Constitutional Right to Discovery? Creating and
Reinforcing Due Process Norms Through the Procedural Laboratory of Arbitration, 15 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 337, 338 (2015) (arguing that "the underpinnings for a due process-like norm
involving a right to discovery in the civil context have begun to take root").
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
41. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,400-01 (1988).
42. See supra note 3 (The proposed rules "are completely one-sided, as in, they only favor
major corporations. The real purpose is to try and prevent cases from going before a jury.").
43. Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON
HALL L. REv. 573 (2003).
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the proposed Constitution only contained a right to a jury trial in criminal
cases.44 The Constitution was ratified in 1789 and eventually incorporated
amendments containing a guarantee to a civil jury trial. The Seventh
Amendment reads, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ... .4 Its
adoption in 1791 was meant to preserve the then-existing right of a jury
trial at common law. Although courts at equity afforded some discovery in
the eighteenth century, common law courts did not have a guaranteed right
to discovery at all.46 To disregard the history of the Seventh Amendment
would mean that the federal courts were violating the Constitution before
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The federal
courts did no such thing and an entitlement to discovery is neither a
constitutional right, nor is it analogous to a right to a jury trial.
B. Burdens in Responding
The other side of the constitutional argument is that due process is
violated when there is an uncompensated duty to respond to discovery.
Litigants requesting discovery may tend to overvalue the information they
seek and undervalue the costs incurred by the responding party in the
American system.47 It follows that litigants responding to discovery will do
the inverse by undervaluing the information sought by the requesting party
and overstating the costs associated with production. Responding parties
argue that "it is expensive to have to find and turn over reams of materials,
and particularly galling when most of that material never reappears in the
case." 48 Although the plaintiffs' view is that broad requests are necessary
to get the real evidence, defendants endorse the view that "'cost shifting'
may be constitutionally required in situations where courts allow plaintiffs
to conduct 'fishing expedition[s]' [for] discovery .... "4 9  Likewise,
Professor Martin Redish argues that the discovery process is analogous to
the theory of quantum meruit where a party is legally entitled to a
reimbursement for any benefits he confers on someone else at that person's
request.5 0  Under this interpretation, the discovery process is a quasi-
contract between litigants, and it would be "morally untenable to allow the
44. Id. at 583.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
46. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 919 (1987).
47. Richard Marcus, "Looking Backward" to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1721 (2014).
4 8. Id
49. Elliott, supra note 10, at 951 (emphasis added); see Martin H. Redish & Colleen
McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79
GEO. WASH L. REV. 773, 775 (2011).
50. Redish & McNamara, supra note 49, at 777.
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requesting party to retain the benefits of its opponent's labor without, at the
very least, reimbursing the costs of discovery incurred by the producing
party."51  The 2015 amendments sought to control over-discovery by
restricting the scope and reinforcing proportionality, thereby deflating these
constitutional arguments.
Attorneys continue to rely on protective orders pursuant to Rule 26 to
fight against the problem of over-broad discovery requests. Under Rule
26(c), a party can move for a protective order to forbid disclosure, specify
terms, prescribe the discovery in a method different than the form
requested, limit inquiry to certain matters, choose who will be present
while discovery occurs, seal a deposition unless ordered open later by court
order, protect trade secrets and confidential research, and seal other
information.52 The notion that the 2015 amendments do not do enough is
unfounded because protective orders are still a viable option to prevent
excessive litigation costs.
C. Unconstitutional Takings
The Supreme Court dealt with a similar due process issue in 1991
when deciding Connecticut v. Doehr.13 The Court in Doehr unanimously
struck down a Connecticut statute because it unconstitutionally authorized
prejudgment attachment of real estate property as security in pending civil
litigation when there was enough probable cause without any finding of
guilt.54 Some have argued that the statute in Doehr is analogous to the due
process argument of allowing parties to request discovery before judicial
scrutiny of the pleadings.55  In Doehr, the Court rejected Connecticut's
argument that its statute was constitutional because it only allowed
attachment when it met the same factual showing as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure's pleading standard of stating a claim with sufficient facts
to withstand a motion to dismiss. 56 As such, some have argued in the
context of discovery where placing "the costs of [a] defense imposed on
every person sued, merely because the plaintiff believes the defendant is
liable-should lead to exactly the same result[,]" and that requiring a
defendant to spend money answering an unverified complaint is no
different than the unconstitutional pre-judgment attachment requirement.5 7
51. Redish & McNamara, supra note 49, at 777.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
53. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
54. Id. at 11.
55. Elliott, supra note 10, at 948.
56. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13.
57. Elliott, supra note 10, at 950 (internal quotations omitted).
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However, the attachment of real property is distinguishable from simply
having a party make evidence available. 8 The Doehr Court dealt with real
property issues that led to a violation in due process such as: clouding the
property title, impairing the ability to sell or alienate the property, tainting
credit rating, and reducing the change of obtaining a home equity loan or
additional mortgage among others. 59 The analogy fails because the issues
with property are not inherently related to a defendant's issues when he or
she is sued or is required to produce discovery. Constitutional arguments
were not justified before, and arguments about costs of compliance and
issues related to takings still do not rise to potential constitutional
violations.
II. The American Discovery System Versus Non-American
Discovery Systems
American and European discovery practices differ in significant ways
that contribute to the costs of litigation. America allows litigants to have
"discovery opportunities that the rest of the world would view as unduly
intrusive, or at least 'extravagant' in terms of the emerging international . . .
consensus." 60 Most common law countries do not use juries, which makes
the use of pretrial discovery in America necessary because the system is
based on jury trials.6 ' The focus on pretrial discovery is less demanding in
civil law systems where the judge identifies the legal and factual issues
involved.62  In America, discovery is therefore a system that informs the
adversarial parties rather than the judge-since he or she is the umpire of
the trial-or the jury because they ultimately will receive very little of the
overall discovery due to admissibility.63 The function of civil pretrial
discovery in relation to a jury trial allows the opposing party to anticipate
the evidence that will be used against it during trial in efforts to persuade
58. Cf City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (holding that the Due Process
Clause does not require officers to give property owners notice of the state law remedies available
to retrieve seized property); see also Fuentes v, Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that a statute
requiring a prejudgment replevin taking of property without prior notice violates due process, but
in regard to search warrants, there is no due process violation for making evidence available
because search warrants are generally issued to serve highly important governmental need).
59. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991).
60. Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 157 (1999).
61. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1017, 1020 (1998).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1021.
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the jury.6 4 In a civil law jurisdiction, the judge serves the role of deciding
fact and law, which includes taking the initiative of "exploring and sifting
evidence." 65 The differences do not end there.
The significant difference in how the American and European legal
systems manage costs lie in the background of the arguments related to
discovery burdens. In most European countries, the fact that a party has
been defeated is sufficient grounds for imposing all of the costs to the
losing party without requiring findings of bad faith and includes
reimbursement to the winner by the losing party in all costs and attorney
fees. 6 Typically, in America, each side pays for its own lawyer regardless
of the outcome. The European practice differs from the American practice
because of the ingrained notion of finality where victory is not complete if
expenses are unpaid.67 Proponents in favor of changing to the English rule
have argued it would effectively deter litigants from filing frivolous
lawsuits. Opponents argue that the English rule would create more burdens
for lower and middle-class individuals from access to the courts.6 1 With
that, some have argued that the English rule nullifies a party's incentive to
purposely raise their adversary's costs because of the risk in having to pay
for it if defeated.69  Parties litigating under the English rule must also
account for the risk in paying their adversary's fees, whereas litigants under
the American rule do not take their adversary's costs into consideration.
As such, like the allocation of costs with discovery, the English rule would
therefore put more at stake in the litigation compared to the American rule.
The difference between the two rules relates to the motivations behind why
defendants prefer the English rule when dealing with discovery requests
(they may end up being reimbursed for the costs of production) and why
plaintiffs prefer the American rule (they can make discovery requests and
pass all of the costs to the defendant).
A huge topic related to the costs associated with winning or losing is
the American use of litigating a case on a contingency fee basis, where the
attorney is paid by a percentage of the ultimate award. Operating under a
contingency fee in America is popular in certain types of litigation but is
64. Hazard, Jr., supra note 61, at 1021.
65. Id. at 1022.
66. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37,44 (1984).
67. Id. at 83.
68. Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, When Courts Determine Fees in a
System with a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60
UCLA L. REv. 1452, 1456-57 (2013).
69. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 336.
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prohibited in foreign jurisdictions such as England and Scotland." There
are three different arrangements for contingency fees. First, an attorney
can be paid a fixed hourly rate or a specified amount in accordance with
hours worked, but payout will only occur if successful.' Second, an
attorney requests a flat or hourly fee that is paid outright, but incurs a bonus
if he or she is successful.72 Third, an attorney is paid a percentage of the
ultimate recovery.7
One scholar theorizes that the contingency fee system's acceptance in
America is based on the theory that the claimant remains responsible for its
own costs. 7 4 In contrast, and as it relates to the American Rule, a European
claimant would have to worry that if he or she loses, then the claimant will
have to reimburse the defendant, thus making the contingency fee
unworkable outside America.7 5 Proponents of the contingency rule say it
encourages plaintiffs to pursue their claims when they otherwise could not
afford a lawyer, decreases frivolous litigation, and maximizes client
76welfare. However, some opponents of the contingency fee system argue
the English rule, requiring the loser to bear all costs, is more appropriate.7 7
These unique aspects of American litigation-heightened pleading
standards and broad discovery rights-highlight the motivations behind the
con due process argument of burdensome discovery.
Differences relating specifically to discovery are also worth noting. In
the United Kingdom, discovery is referred to as disclosure.78 On the other
hand, the most significant difference between the two legal systems
regarding discovery is that in the United Kingdom the loser pays the costs
associated with production, whereas in America the discovery-producing
party pays. 7 9 This single difference has given rise to the unique arguments
in America that deal with the violation of a responding party's
constitutional rights relating to discovery. The idea behind the English rule
is to safeguard against frivolous cases and those without merit because
70. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a
Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 626-27 (1995).
71. Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey of the Law, Ethics, and Economics of Attorney
Contingent Fee Arrangements, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 773, 775 (2009-2010).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Pfennigstorf, supra note 67, at 60.
75. Id.
76. Painter, supra note 71, at 628; Shajnfeld, supra note 72, at 774.
77. Painter, supra note 71, at 628.
78. Nigel Murray, Discovery from the European Perspective, ABA LAW PRACTICE TODAY
(Oct. 2008), http://ilta.personifycloud.com/webfiles/productfiles/5 1/LIT I.pdf.
79. Id.
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parties bringing those claims know of the significant risks in paying
attorney's fees and discovery costs against their adversary.o The effects of
the "loser pays" system, proponents say, is that optimistic plaintiffs are
encouraged to sue while pessimistic plaintiffs are not, because of the costly
risk associated with losing.8
III. The History of Past Amendments to FRCP 26 Regarding
Proportionality
Litigation pre-1983 invited litigants to request as much discovery as
they wanted. As written, Rule 26 stated that unless ordered by the court,
the "frequency of use" of the various discovery methods was not limited.82
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ended the
use of broad discovery, and replaced it with the principal of proportionality
in order to limit the frequent use of "excessively costly and time-
consuming activities that [were] disproportionate to the nature of the
case . . . ."83 Simply put, the 1983 amendment's emphasis on
proportionality attempted to make it so discovery "will not permit litigants
to use a bazooka where a water pistol [would] do." 84 Similar to the 1983
amendments, the 2015 amendments also sought to restrict the use of over-
discovery.s The notion of proportionality, although not explicit, appeared
in the 1983 amendments when the rule read discovery shall be limited if,
(i) [T]he discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii)
the party seeking discovery has ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
80. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 16, at 336.
81. Id. at 337.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (pre-1983 amendments).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments.
84. Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local
Rules, 30 VILL. L. REv. 767, 789 (1985).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendments ("Rule 26(b)(1) has
been amended to add a sentence to deal with the problem of over-discovery. The objective is to
guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the
amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of
inquiry.")
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controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.8 6
The incorporation of these factors later were moved down from the
second paragraph of Rule 26(b)(1) by the 1993 amendments to Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Though the text still did not explicitly use the word
"proportional," the 1993 amendments listed a number of factors. in allowing
a judge to rule on discovery motions in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 87  Those
factors included: (1) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, (2) considering the needs of the case, (3) the
amount in controversy, (4) the parties' resources, (5) the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and (6) the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues (the ordering of these factors are changed in the 2015
amendments).88 The rulemakers amended the scope of discovery under
Rule 26(b)(1) in 2000 to allow courts to be more involved in managing
discovery that was "relevant to the claim or defense of any party." The
inclusion of proportionality appears in a cross-reference to Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) in the language "[a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations
imposed by [now Rule 26(b)(2)(C)]."' 9
The location of the proportionality factors was not the only component
that needed to be reworked throughout the history of Rule 26. The
language within the scope of discovery has been through changes
surrounding the phrase "reasonably calculated." Rule 26 contained this
language before the emphasis of proportionality in the 1983 amendments. 90
The problem with this language arose because litigants seeking discovery
in the past have improperly used the phrase, "reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence," arguing that their broad requests
fit into the calculation. 91 Parties were confusing the language to define the
scope of discovery generally and used it for broad discovery despite the
proportionality limitations of the 1983 amendments against over-discovery.
The 2000 amendments attempted to fix that problem by adding the word
"relevant" in order to make clear that the "reasonably calculated" language
was limited to the scope of discovery listed in that subsection. 92
86. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
87. See Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594 (D. Nev. 2016).
88. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments (referring to
the 2000 amendments).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 1970 amendments.
91. Marcus, supra note 47, at 1719.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
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Subsequently, many lawyers misused the newly added word "relevant" to
refer to the meaning of admissible evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401.93 The misuse of relevancy occurred despite the Advisory
Committee Note expressly stating that "[r]elevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence." 94  Fortunately, the phrase
"reasonably calculated" has been removed to deal with this confusion in
order to restrict the use of over-discovery. 95  In its place, the 2015
amendments included "[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable" in Rule 26(b)(1) to deal
with the confusion of relevancy.9 6 Deleting confusing language was one
of many changes to the scope of discovery that reflect the 2015
amendment's goal of keeping costs down.
IV. The Response: Rulemakers Emphasize Recalibration
Rulemakers have responded to recent constitutional challenges by
recalibrating the scope of discovery since the 1983 amendments. When the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, cases were simpler
and discovery was limited to the nature of their simple facts. 97 There are
two distinct types of cases in civil litigation.98 The first is the discovery
concerning ordinary cases, which pass through the courts cheaply without
discovery issues.99 However, the second involves the high-stakes and high-
conflict cases that tend to cause more problems due to voluminous
discovery. 100 The need to elevate and rearrange the proportionality factors
higher in Rule 26 was important because judges were not heavily using
them when ruling on discovery motions. The American College of Trial
Lawyers survey found that "76.8% of Fellows agree that judges [did] not
invoke Rule 26(b)(2)(C) on their own initiative." 0 ' The 2015 amendments
93. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.").
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (pre-2015 amendments).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
97. Elliott, supra note 10, at 908 n.53.
98. Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Coast and Delay to
the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REv. 597 (1998).
99. Id.
100. Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Coast and Delay to
the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REv. 597 (1998).
101. See, e.g., KIRSTEN BARRETT, RHODA COHEN & JOHN HALL, MATHEMATICA POLICY
RESEARCH, INC., ACTL CIVIL LITIGATION SURVEY, FINAL REPORT 41 (2008); see also Emery
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seek to revitalize what the 1983 amendments originally sought to do by
incorporating proportionality into the scope of discovery definition to
reinvigorate the existing trend of its use.'O2 Discovery must now focus on
the needs of the case, as emphasized in the new Rule 26(b)(1), and involve
a more active federal judge as the neutral arbitrator.' 03  However, just
because the notion of proportionality is appealing does not necessarily
mean it will be easy to apply.1 0 4 The objective was and still is to guard
against redundant and disproportionate discovery by giving the court
authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters
that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.o Some redundancy in the
intentions of different amendments must be warranted because the 2015
amendments are building off what earlier amendments say efficient
discovery management ought to be.
It is important to understand the changes in prior amendments to
appreciate the tweaks in the new ones. In addition to moving the location
of proportionality to the forefront of the rule, the order of the other factors
since the 1993 amendments also have been rearranged in Rule 26(b)(1)'s
new scope of discovery.106 Some judges have interpreted this change as
minimal and have continued to treat all factors as weighing equally when
determining proportionality. 107 Other judges view the change as a way to
put "the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation" before "the
amount in controversy" to emphasize that some cases deal with little or no
money but involve important public and private substantive issues.' 08 The
emphasis on proportionality in the 2015 amendments continues the trend
G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Litigation, 60 DUKE
L.J. 765, 773 n.32.
102. Marcus, supra note 47, at 1717.
103. See Chief Justice Roberts, supra note 1, at 7.
104. Marcus, supra note 47, at 1717.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
106. Supra note 89, ((1) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, (2) considering the needs of the case, (3) the amount in controversy, (4) the parties'
resources, (5) the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and (6) the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues.); cf FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) ("[A]nd proportional to the needs
of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.").
107. See Bell v. Reading Hosp., No. 13-5927, 2016 WL 162991, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14,
2016) (finding that "proportionality determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis using
the factors listed in Rule 26(b)(1), and that no single factor is designed to outweigh the other
factors in determining whether the discovery sought is proportional").
108. United States Courts, Civil Rules 2015-Proportional Discovery, YOUTUBE (Dec. 21,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-c2Fje4GzmGg.
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set by the 1983 amendments at the time of their adoption. 109  The
reemphasis is also necessary because the subsequent amendments after
1983 may have inadvertently diluted the notion of proportionality.' 10
Emphasizing proportionality is the answer to lowering litigation costs and
responding to the recent constitutional challenges regarding costs.
V. FRCP 26(b)(1) Proportionality Safeguards Due Process
Rights
Although the American and English legal systems have differences in
handling the costs of discovery, they also share similarities. English courts
use reasonableness when reviewing disclosure requests."' The main focus
when evaluating reasonableness in English courts is exactly what the new
scope of discovery attempts to emphasize: proportionality. Both systems
review discovery requests by considering: (1) the number of documents
involved, (2) the nature and complexity of the proceedings, (3) the ease and
expense of retrieving any particular document, and (4) the significance of
any document that is likely to be found.112 According to Professor Martin
Redish, "the fact that a party's opponent will have to bear the financial
burden of preparing the discovery response actually gives litigants an
incentive to make discovery requests, and the bigger the expense to be
borne by the opponent, the bigger the incentive to make the request."'1 3
Even with the heightened emphasis on proportionality that the new
amendments bring to the table, many believe that they are not enough to
shield litigants from the heavy, arguably due process violating, costs that
are associated with producing electronically stored information.1 14 In 2009,
the cost of e-discovery was $2.8 billion and was estimated to rise ten
percent to fifteen percent annually in subsequent years."' Global e-
discovery expenditures are expected to be well over ten billion dollars.
One of the causes of the high costs of e-discovery comes from the need to
109. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747, 773-74 (1998)
("[T]he amendment itself seems to have created only a ripple in the caselaw, although some
courts now acknowledge that it is clearer than it was before that they should take responsibility
for the amount of discovery in cases they manage.") (quoting 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2008.1, 121 (2d ed. 1994)).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
111. Murray, supra note 78.
112. Id.
113. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE. L.J. 561,
603 (2001).
114. Beisner, supra note 2.
115. John T. Yip, Addressing the Costs and Comity Concerns of International E-Discovery,
87 WASH. L. REv. 595, 595-96 (2012).
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restore and reformat back up tapes, which many corporations use to guard
against data loss." 6 Back up tapes are typically compressed for maximum
capacity and must be reformatted when litigants seek information via
discovery requests.'"7  Opponents of the 2015 amendments continue to
believe e-discovery has the potential to violate due process rights and still
are not convinced that the proportionality requirement goes far enough to
shield litigants from the costs in complex civil discovery because of these
growing expenditures."l 8 Opponents claim that the amendments address
and will likely reduce the amount of discovery in litigated cases but do not
fully address the burdens that come into the larger picture of the American
rule where the producer pays." 9
These arguments prove to be weak in light of the 2015 amendments
because the cases decided since December indicate a cost-conscious
approach taken by judges when evaluating costs. The purpose of the 2015
amendments is to bring further judicial involvement into the equation by
having judges participate in the management of discovery early on in the
litigation and to play an active role in determining what is proportional.
Given the constitutional ramifications, some detail about this emerging
practice is warranted.
A. Responsibility of Providing Information on Proportionality
Proportionality is measured by the list of factors new to Rule 26(b)(1)
that were previously in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Who is responsible for
weighing these factors? The Advisory Committee Note explicitly states
that the responsibility is not on the party seeking discovery to calculate all
proportionality considerations.1 20 Rather, the Advisory Committee Note
places the responsibility on the parties and the court to collectively resolve
these disputes.12' The judge ultimately decides the discovery motions, but
both sides are responsible for informing the judge on the issues and are
expected to resolve discovery disputes early on in pretrial conferences.
The requesting party typically sets forth reasons why it needs the
discovery, and the responding party objects by stating why it would be too
burdensome. The judge then decides which party has the more persuasive
116. Gideon Mark, Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. JL. REFORM 405, 417 (2013).
117. Id
118. Beisner, supra note 2.
119. Id.
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
121. Id.
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argument. 2 2 Additionally, the Advisory Committee Note emphasizes that
parties responding to discovery cannot refuse to provide relevant material
by simply saying it is disproportional to the needs of the case when
objecting and nothing more. 123 The requesting party is in a better position
to articulate why it needs the information. Similarly, the responding party
claiming undue burden in responding is likely to be the only one who can
provide information on why it is burdensome.1 24
B. Judicial Interpretations Since December 1, 2015
Since the amendments went into effect on December 1, 2015, there
have been many reported decisions that utilize the new proportionality
tools and none of them incorporate any successful constitutional arguments
regarding burdensome discovery. In Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly
Administration, Inc., plaintiff employee sued defendant employer under
Title VII relating to various unlawful employment actions.1 25 Defendant
successfully produced seven performance evaluations of employees that
plaintiff requested.1 26  Nonetheless, plaintiff subsequently requested
defendant to "identify all individuals employed in the positions Plaintiff
held ... from 2005 through the present, including his/her job title, phone
number, address, start date, disciplinary history (including whether ever
placed in a performance improvement plan (PIP)), termination date (if
applicable), reason for termination, and salary." 27 The court found the
request too overly broad and therefore disproportional to the needs of the
case because there was no reason to believe similarly situated employees
existed that were treated more favorably.1 28 Even when Plaintiff offered to
limit the scope of her search to "those employees who were disciplined for
the same conduct Defendants purportedly terminated Plaintiff for," the
court denied Plaintiffs motion to compel because she did not put forth any
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments ("[T]he
proportionality calculation ... does not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the
parties to consider proportionality, and the change does not place on the party seeking discovery
the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations.")
123. Id ("Nor is the change intended to permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply
by making a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional. The parties and the court have a
collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in
resolving discovery disputes.").
124. Id
125. Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-00399, 2016 WL 471364,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2016).
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id. at *I.
128. Id. at *2.
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factual support to indicate the discovery request was not equivalent to a
fishing expedition. 12 9 In this case, the judge's decision is an example of
careful judicial scrutiny of the discovery proponent's justification. The
weighing of proportionality favored denying Plaintiffs motion to compel
because Defendants laid off sixty percent of their workforce due to the
winding down of its business and the burdens of identifying and producing
all of their information outweighed plaintiffs need.1 30  Therefore,
"[a]lthough Plaintiff does not have access to all the requested information,
the other proportionality factors-mainly Defendants' resources and the
burden and expense of production-outweigh the production's likely
benefit to Plaintiff." 3 1
According to The Wall Street Journal, "[c]ompanies notched a quiet
win .. . when the federal courts adopted rules intended to curb the scope of
pretrial evidence requests . .. ." 32 Lawyers for Civil Justice, a legal group
comprised of companies such as PG&E, Ford Motor, FedEx, Microsoft,
and State Farm, expressed their relief because the amendments would
provide less leverage for plaintiffs to pressure with unnecessary costs.1 3 3
Indeed, the Lawyers for Civil Justice's comments confirm that due process
violations are not a threat but it may have exaggerated its win. Plaintiffs
are not completely shut out from making requests to collect information
necessary for their cases. Rule 34(b) has also been amended to reflect
plaintiffs' need to know what is being withheld. Under Rule 34(b)(2)(C),
an objection must state what, if any, materials are being withheld-which
is congruent with the Advisory Committee Note regarding boilerplate
objections in Rule 26.134 Patriot Rail Corp v. Sierra Railroad Co. is an
example of how boilerplate objections are prohibited grounds for
noncompliance to a request for production. Patriot moved for a protective
order in response to a request from Sierra to provide all related documents
from the beginning of the litigation regarding the company's financial
downfall.1 35 Although the broad request dated back eight years, the court
129. Marsden, No. 3:14-cv-00399, at *2.
130. Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-00399, 2016 WL 471364,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2016).
131. Id.
132. Joe Palazzolo & Jess Bravin, Businesses Win Lawsuit Curbs with New Rules: Change




134. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
135. Patriot Rail Corp. v. Sierra R.R. Co., No. 2:09-cv-0009, 2016 WL 492702, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2016).
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denied the motion for a protective order finding Patriot's arguments to be
insufficient because it did not explain why it was unduly burdensome and
harassing in detail. 13 6 A party objecting to a discovery request now has to
show with specificity why the request does not comply with Rule
26(b)(1)'s scope of discovery.137
Careful judicial scrutiny of the scope of discovery made in the
requests will be the catalyst in lowering discovery costs and ensuring that
due process arguments remain ineffective. In Gilead Sciences, Inc. v.
Merck & Co., Inc., the court analogized a broad discovery request
regarding a patent infringement to suggest that "[i]t would be like requiring
[General Motors] to produce discovery on Buicks and Chevys in a patent
case about Cadillacs simply because all three happen to be cars."' 38 In the
future, parties requesting discovery must seek relevant information to their
case and be ready to explain such relevance-otherwise, they will be
subject to a valid objection based on proportionality or a protective order
that forces them to pay the costs associated with its production (but not an
objection based on due process).
Contrast Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a 1976 case before the
introduction of proportionality where the district court denied defendant's
request for a protective order when it argued that forcing it to produce a
massive discovery request would be a violation of its constitutional right to
due process.1 3 9  In Kozlowski, Plaintiff was a minor that was severely
burned when a pair of pajamas allegedly manufactured and marketed by
defendant Sears caught fire. 14 0  Plaintiff sought all complaints and
communications concerning personal injuries or deaths allegedly caused by
the burning of children's nightwear, which had been manufactured or
marketed by Defendant.141 The court stated "merely because compliance
with 'Request for Production' would be costly or time-consuming is not
ordinarily sufficient reason to grant a protective order where the requested
136. Patriot Rail Corp., 2016 WL 492702, at *3
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments (explaining that
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective December 2, 2015, requires objections
to discovery requests to be made with "specificity" and "an objection must state whether any
responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of the objection.").
138. Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 5:13-cv-04057, 2016 WL 146574, at
*1-2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016). Here, plaintiff sought evidence regarding two alleged patent
infringements. ("Merck's demands are exactly the type of disproportionate demands that Rule
26(b)(1) proscribes. Sure, it's possible that Gilead's evidence confirming the compounds are not
PSI-6130 is false and even concocted. But Merck offers no real evidence that this is the
case .... ).
139. Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 74-76 (D. Mass. 1976).
140. Id. at 74.
141. Id. at 74-75.
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material is relevant and necessary to the discovery of evidence."1 42 The
court similarly rejected defendant's offer of shifting the costs of production
to plaintiff by simply inviting and allowing access to gather and organize
the documents itself.1 4 3  Sears did not offer anything in regards to the
discovery request. It simply stonewalled, and the court found its behavior
unacceptable.
Kozlowski is an example in which a single plaintiff makes a broad and
costly discovery request against a large wealthy defendant. What would
happen if Kozlowski was decided in 2016? An opportunity to evaluate the
workability of proportionality is shown by contrasting Kozlowski with R.
Fellen, Inc. v. Rehabcare Group, a case decided after the 2015
amendments. In R. Fellen, Plaintiff sued Defendant for allegedly violating
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending junk faxes.1 44
Defendant raised an affirmative defense by claiming to have prior express
permission ("PEP") or an existing business relationship ("EBR") with the
recipients of the alleged junk faxes.1 4 5 Plaintiff requested defendant to
identify each and every person it contended gave PEP or whom it had an
EBR with when it sent any faxes.1 4 6 In other words, Plaintiff made a broad
request for every fax number of each party defendant ever sent a fax to
during the relevant time. The level of judicial scrutiny regarding
proportionality here is what differentiates this case from Kozlowski and
shows the trend currently in place. In R. Fellen, the judge found the
request to be "excessively overbroad" because the request was unduly
vague. 147 Furthermore, the judge in R. Fellen seemed to accept the same
argument that was rejected in Kozlowski regarding a lack of a specific
record keeping. The lack of record keeping of each facsimile number's
origin assisted in denying the motion to compel.1 4 8 The judge cited the new
scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) in adjudicating the motion.
C. Constitutional Challenges to Discovery After December 1, 2015
The discovery practice of leaving no stone unturned for the sole
purpose of increasing the costs against the opposing party is as nonsensical
142. Id. at 76.
143. Id.
144. R. Fellen, Inc. v. Rehabcare Grp., No. 1:14-cv-2081, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15228, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016).
145. Id. at * 2.
146. Id at *4.
147. Id. at *9.
148. Id at *10 ("As written, and because Defendant does not keep a record of each facsimile
number's origin, Defendant is correct that there is no way for it to reasonably respond to this
interrogatory.").
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as settling disputes with dueling pistols. The 2015 amendments are a
reminder that federal courts need to foster and encourage the peaceful
resolutions of disputes. Hopefully, with the assistance of the revamped
proportionality considerations, there will be an end to the practice of
adversaries using "creatively burdensome discovery requests or evading
legitimate requests through dilatory tactics."1 4 9 The recent constitutional
challenges to American discovery are weak in light of the 2015 rule
amendments. Along with changes in Rule 26 also came changes to Rules
1, 4(m), 16, 34, 37(e). Collectively, these rule changes invite and set the
expectation of close judicial involvement for more effective and
cooperative issue solving regarding cost management. Those expectations
look promising because recent judicial decisions show that judges are
becoming more active in the discovery process in order to reduce costs
where discovery would be redundant and duplicative otherwise.150
Furthermore, judicial decisions also show that requesting parties benefit
from the 2015 rule amendments where protective orders are denied due to a
failure to object or respond with specificity.' 5  Rule 34 allows more
transparency between the disputes and puts the judge in the front seat to
decide, alongside the litigants, what would be proportional under the new
scope of discovery.1 52  With costs minimized and early involvement by
judges in resolving discovery disputes, everyone, courts included, has
much to benefit from going forward. With the 2015 amendments, there is
no room to fit constitutional challenges against American discovery.
149. See Chief Justice Roberts, supra note 1, at 11.
150. Youssef v. Lynch, No. 11-1362, 2016 WL 183504, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2016) ("In
light of the documents' duplicative nature and the fact that the disciplinary proceedings are in no
way related to Plaintiffs retaliation claim or any of the facts underlying Plaintiff s case, the Court
finds that discovery of the additional documents in Defendant's possession would not be
'proportional to the needs of the case' under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)."); see United States ex rel.
Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that "[c]onsiderations of
proportionality weigh against compelling" discovery that is duplicative or a subset of other
requested discovery and that requesting the production of information that is a "largely irrelevant
subset would outweigh its likely benefit and be disproportionate to the needs of the case.").
151. Kissing Camels Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Centura Health Corp., No. 12-cv-03012, 2016 WL
27772,1 at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 22, 2016) ("Plaintiffs' boilerplate objections are no better. Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective December 2, 2015, requires objections to
discovery requests to be made with 'specificity' and 'an objection must state whether any
responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of the objection."') (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
34 (b)(2)(B)-(C)).
152. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(2)(C) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
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VI. FRCP 37(e) Clarifies Sanctions to Further Eliminate
Unnecessary Costs
Electronically stored information has been referred to under the scope
of discovery limitations regarding proportionality in the past and present
amendments. 53  There are grounds to excuse the production of
electronically stored information if it does not fit within the proportionality
clause in Rule 26(b)(2)(B). Furthermore, the Advisory Committee Note to
the 2015 amendment of the Rule 37 duty to preserve also provides further
guidance on how proportionality plays a role. The Advisory Committee
Note explicitly states that the reasonableness of preservation efforts is a
factor in determining proportionality and that the information sought must
be proportional to the importance of the claims or defenses being
litigated.154 However, repercussions still exist for failing to preserve
electronically stored information when proportionality is found. Analyzing
the change in reasonableness of preserving electronically stored
information is an important factor in evaluating the potential costs of
litigation and the trend towards limiting those costs. Unnecessary costs can
come from spending in order to over-preserve or spending in the form of
sanctions for failing to preserve.
A. Over-Preservation and Sanctions for Failing to Preserve
The 2015 amendments to Rule 37 respond to the extreme and growing
burden claimed by some that result from the duty to preserve potential
evidence that may or may not be made available in litigation later. These
expenses regarding preservation play a role in the overall cost of litigation.
Rule 37(e) did not focus on whether or when a duty to preserve exists, but
what courts must do when that duty is breached. The duty to preserve
arises when there is a reasonable anticipation of litigation. The exchange
of documents has always been the hallmark of discovery, but the term
"document" entails a lot more now than it did in the past.15  As the
computer continues to be the center of many features in life, the rules of
discovery continue to develop to accommodate the effects it has on
litigation.1 5 6 As amended, Rule 37(e) reads,
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) ("A party need not provide discovery of electronically
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost.").
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
155. See generally Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses
to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (2004).
156. Id
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Failure to Produce Preserve Electronically Stored
Information. If electronically stored information that
should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct
of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable
steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced
through additional discovery, the court: (1) upon finding
prejudice to another party from loss of the information,
may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the
prejudice; or (2) only upon finding that the party acted
with the intent to deprive another party of the
information's use in the litigation may: (A) presume that
the lost information was unfavorable to the party; (B)
instruct the jury that it may or must presume the
information was unfavorable to the party; or (C) dismiss
the action or enter a default judgment.",1 7
Prior to this amendment, some circuits ruled that a court could impose
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) for mere negligent failure to preserve.' The
sanctions that the rule imposes may come in many measures listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), 159 or in the form of a jury instruction that it may "(A)
presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party; (B) instruct
the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the
party; or (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment."l 60
Nonetheless, the newly amended Rule 37(e) requires the court to make a
finding of intent in order to impose these sanctions.'6 1 In Nuvasive, Inc. v.
Madsen Medical, Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California granted defendant's motion in July 2015 for sanctions
when the court found that Plaintiff had unintentionally failed to preserve
157. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e) (emphasis added to identify the amendment).
158. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2002).
159. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii):
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts
be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party
claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in
evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or
proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the
disobedient party; or (vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey
any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
161. FED. R. Civ. P.37(e).
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certain electronic messages relevant to the case.' 62  Based on this
determination, the court approved an adverse inference instruction against
Plaintiff because of its failure to preserve.1 6 3 Still, the court reconsidered
its ruling in light of the 2015 amendments in addition to the trial date being
set for February 2016.164 With these new factors in consideration, the court
rescinded its earlier approval of an adverse jury instruction because the
amendments now require a specific finding of intent in order to give such
165
an instruction.
Intent to spoil no longer requires a finding of bad faith, but it is still a
factor in determining what sanction is appropriate. In InternMatch, Inc. v.
Nxtbigthing, LLC, a district court concluded that a sanction under Rule
37(e)(2), short of an entry of default judgment, was appropriate.' 66  in
Internmatch, Plaintiff sought discovery in the form of dated electronic
documents to establish that defendant's use of a trademark was not
continuously and extensively out to the consumer market before its own.
The court found that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps to preserve
these documents when he allowed his wife to discard the computer after
two lightning strikes allegedly caused damage to the device.1 6 8 In awarding
an adverse jury instruction, the court relied on evidence that no reasonable
attempts to preserve were taken and evidence showing the existence of
Defendant's acts of bad faith to mislead opposing counsel. 16 9
B. Eliminating the Need for Over-Perseveration by Focusing on
"Reasonable Steps"
Rule 37(e)'s requirement for "reasonable steps" recognizes that
preserving information can come in a variety of methods and need not be
perfect.1 70 Unless the intent to spoil is found, the failure to take reasonable
steps to preserve is not the end-all and be-all in permitting sanctions. The
purpose of preserving electronically stored information is to allow a judge
to make the determination on a future date as to whether production of the
162. Nuvasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., No. 13-cv-2077, 2016 WL 305096, at *1-2 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 26, 2016).
163. Id. at 2-3.
164. Id
165. Nuvasive, Inc., No. 13-cv-2077, at 2-3.
166. InternMatch, Inc. v. Nxtbigthing, LLC, No. 14-cv-05438, 2016 WL 49148, at *13 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2016).
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id. at *13.
170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendments.
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information would be necessary.171 Prior to these amendments, the risk of
being sanctioned led to over-preservation. Over-preservation forced
litigants to spend burdensome amounts of money in order to preserve based
on the fear of sanctions. When reasonable steps are not taken, the next
question is whether if the information is "lost" within the meaning of Rule
37. If the information sought is not lost, then a court need not determine
whether it must impose sanctions. Instead, a court can
[Make] the kinds of adjustments frequently used in
managing discovery if a party is unable to provide relevant
responsive information. For example, a court could order
the responding party to produce an additional witness for
deposition, respond to additional interrogatories, or make
similar attempts to provide substitutes or alternatives for
some or all of the lost information.172
This amendment was meant to clarify confusion in the circuit courts as
to when sanctions were proper. With this better-defined standard, the
burden is lifted from the need to over-preserve because sanctions have
taken a backseat in priority and now allow courts to determine if there are
any alternative means of obtaining similar or equivalent information.
Conclusion
The constitutional challenges to American discovery have always
lingered in the background but needed to be overstated to be heard. When
the 1983 proportionality provisions were introduced in 1983, many thought
that a huge change to federal discovery would come with it because of its
impact on restricting redundant discovery.1 7 3 However, the change came as
a ripple effect.1 74 Now with the 2015 amendments in place, constitutional
challenges to American discovery will be cast away while the use of
proportionality will be felt with much more force. Proportionality has now
been elevated to the basic definition of the scope of discovery and has been
revitalized, thus far, into the many recent discussions during discovery
motions. Litigants can now be more at ease about sanctions provided they
171. Marcus, supra note 156, at 14 ("All that preservation does is to ensure that a judge will
be able to make that determination at a time when it can be put into effect if the justification for
production seems sufficient.").
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendments.
173. Marcus, supra note 47, at 1717.
174. Id.
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act reasonably in preserving potential evidence.175 To keep the boat sailing,
judicial involvement must be active and consistent so that parties remain
true to the goals of the 2015 amendments. Constitutional challenges to
American discovery cannot survive with the 2015 amendments in place.
[T]he existing discovery rules have been attacked as 'un-
American' and a proposed amendment designed to
constrain discovery has faced the same criticism.
- Richard Marcus1 76
175. UC Hastings Law, E-Discovery: Fiat Justitia with Richard Marcus, YOuTuBE (June
14, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-BXWiqGeuno.
176. Marcus, supra note 48, at 1721-22.
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